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This capstone explored the littoral combat ship (LCS) and its potential to fulfill the anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) mission for open ocean escort of high value assets. A systems 
engineering approach was used to develop requirements and implement modeling and 
simulation through a clearly defined prime directive and concept of operations, measures 
of effectiveness, and measures of performance. The effort was concentrated on the 
detection, identification and tracking variables of the ASW mission kill chain with an 
emphasis on active sonar. Data was entered into a Zwicky morphological box and a Pugh 
matrix to assess candidate solutions in an analysis of alternatives. To address Department 
of Defense fiscal constraints, the LCS will allow coverage for a wider spectrum of anti-
submarine threats in a theoretically less costly platform than traditional nuclear 
submarines. 
The ability for the U.S. Navy to maintain its open ocean dominance now and into 
the foreseeable future will depend on new and innovative threat capability designs. The 
modular concept of the LCS platform and its agile performance make it a candidate to 
satisfy a lower cost ASW mission platform while addressing the changing complexity of 
threat detection, identification and tracking of enemy subsurface threats. Network fusion 
and connectivity, integrated sensor capabilities and an eccentric mix of subsurface and 
aerial surveillance may be combined to meet the requirements for a reliable ASW 
platform. The LCS could provide ASW escort capability to allow high value units or non-
combatants the ability to safely transit the open ocean. 
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The United States Navy littoral combat ship (LCS) is a class of small surface vessels 
intended to operate close to shore or in the littoral zone. This project explored the 
feasibility of utilizing this platform to perform an open ocean anti-submarine mission for 
escort operations and what combinations of assets could potentially be included in such a 
module if there were to be one. An open ocean ASW mission would require that the LCS 
be able to search, identify, and classify submarine threats throughout the water column 
and would utilize the sea frame in a manner outside of its originally intended reference 
profile. The team concluded that this platform could, in fact, be capable of providing this 
functionality and explored possible mission package configurations for further study. 
The Navy has focused considerable effort toward the LCS program due to its 
modular design concept that allows the vessel to be reconfigured for different missions. 
This modular concept can support a host of roles and reduce the cost of specialized ships 
for specific mission areas. The LCS is currently planned to support surface warfare, mine 
countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare missions utilizing specific mission 
modules. Joint Publication 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, 
states:  
Control of the undersea portion of the operational area is vital to the 
success of joint operations. A principle threat comes from enemy 
submarines. A single un-located submarine could create a significant 
operational, diplomatic, or economic impact. To counter this threat, the 
Joint Functional Concept (JFC) will coordinate, and when required, 
integrate assets from the joint force to conduct ASW during all phases of 
the joint operation of campaign. ASW is an operation conducted with the 
intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 2013, IV-9) 
Modeling and simulation tools were used to provide analysis to determine if the 
LCS platform could perform the open ocean ASW mission utilizing a combination of on-
board and off-board assets with a focus on active sonar. If a successful combination of 
 xviii 
elements could be found to meet the functional requirements, the chosen module could 
ultimately reduce the demand on existing submarine forces and in the long term reduce 
the financial burden on the Department of Defense.  
The threat environment encompasses several security situations. The Naval 
Operational Concept 2010 defines these situations and risk areas, stating: 
Adversaries with blue water capabilities may threaten combat and support 
forces transiting from their forward station, forward presence operating 
area, or point of departure in the continental United States to the theater of 
operations. Although U.S. naval forces can be surprised while transiting in 
the blue water, there are few threats in the current security environment 
that can effectively challenge U.S. combatants in the open ocean. Thus, it 
is likely adversaries will focus on interdicting sealift, expeditionary strike 
force, and merchant vessels deploying and sustaining the joint force. 
Alternatively, or concurrently, adversaries may elect to interdict 
commercial shipping to degrade U.S. economy and capacity to support the 
conflict. In either case, naval forces will be required to neutralize or 
destroy air, surface and subsurface threats to high value vessels during 
their transit; using standard escort, area defense, integrated air missile 
defense, anti-submarine warfare tactics, techniques and procedures. 
(United States Navy, United States Marine Corps and United States Coast 
Guard 2010)  
To effectively protect a high value unit, the LCS must be able to detect, identify, 
and track subsurface threats before they become a threat to U.S. or allied high value sea-
going assets. The tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to neutralize a subsurface 
threat can be complex and elaborate. Simply preventing the enemy from firing its 
weapons through basic intervention thus preventing an attack requires a high degree of 
coordination and tactical expertise. Successful engagements depend on the detection 
range of the sensors, counter-detection range of the enemy sensors, and the range of the 
missile/torpedoes of both combatants. Based on the modeling and simulations of various 
scenarios and variables, the greatest impact to mission accomplishment seen in this 
experiment was the number of LCS platforms present in the search area followed by 
sensor capability, speed, and search time. 
Attributes such as detection ranges, sensor capabilities, and weapons envelopes 
were used to identify the best combination of sensors and weapons to defend against an 
 xix 
ASW threat. Additionally, two key operational level objectives were used as variables in 
determining the best options: hold enemy forces at risk and secure friendly maneuver 
area, as outlined in the ASW Concept of Operations for the 21
st 
Century (United States 
Navy, 2009). These additional key objectives manifested into additional attributes that 
supported the importance of the number of LCS used during the scenarios. Modeling and 
simulation outputs in a sound systems engineering process were utilized to conclude that 
the LCS is a viable option for the ASW open ocean escort mission. The Cost Analysis 
Appendix contains more information on cost estimations for specific technology 
combinations of on-board and off-board assets for an initial evaluation that would support 
a business case analysis for using this platform over the current legacy submarine forces. 
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The security and prosperity of our nation, and that of our friends and 
allies, depends on the freedom of the seas, particularly at the strategic 
maritime crossroads. (Greenert 2012)  
The LCS platforms, represented in Figure 1, are designed to be fast, agile, and 
networked surface combatants designed for operating in the littorals. The strength of the 
LCS lies in its reconfigurable design approach, applying modularity for operational 
flexibility. Fundamental to this design approach is the capability to install rapidly and 
integrate modular mission packages (MPs) onto the ship. As envisioned by the LCS 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the primary MPs of the LCS include anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare (SUW).  
 
Figure 1.  USS Freedom (LCS-1) and USS Independence (LCS-2) (from Jean 2010) 
A MP consists of mission modules, mission crew detachments, and support 
aircraft. A mission module (MM) combines individual mission systems (vehicles, 
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sensors, communications, and weapon systems), support equipment, and command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) components. 
The Navy is currently developing and procuring MPs to meet the joint war 
fighting requirements outlined in the Flight 0+ LCS Capabilities Description Document 
(CDD). Figure 2 illustrates a notional concept for an ASW MP for use in the littorals. 
 
Figure 2.  Mission Package Definition (after Czapiewski 2004) 
Evaluating the ASW MP for the littorals gives rise to the question as to its 
applicability in the open ocean ASW role. What are the requirements and capabilities 
necessary to produce the most suitable active sonar based LCS ASW mission module 
(MM) that would enable the detection, identification, and tracking of enemy submarine 
threats to high value assets in an open ocean, deep water environment? 
B. GOAL 
What makes this project unique is that the LCS was not originally designed as an 
open ocean ASW platform. If the research and analysis outcome are favorable to the LCS 
having the capability to perform the ASW mission, then implicitly this new capability 
 3 
could result in a multi-role LCS that would lower costly submarine workload and 
ultimately lower surface warfare counter ASW cost. Figure 3 shows a notional 
operational scheme for potential ASW mission systems. Of note, this project was 
conducted independent of the Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ship (PEO 
LCS). The team executing the study was limited to open source information that could be 
retrieved from the internet or other unclassified open source media.  
 
Figure 3.  ASW GAO Graphic (from LaGrone 2013) 
The open-ocean ASW role has several parts: Escort of high-value units (HVUs) 
such as battle groups and implicitly carriers; clearing areas of the ocean for operations; 
and surveillance and tracking of the submarine threat. The sensors used are primarily, but 




research question is: what are the requirements for the LCS to perform the open-ocean 
ASW role? From that comes the question: can the existing MPs support the open ocean 
role and at what cost? 
C. APPROACH 
The open-ocean ASW role is threat driven. To define and scope the threat, open-
source information about submarines was researched and explored to help understand the 
existing threat posed to high value assets. Not surprisingly, torpedoes and anti-surface 
missiles launched from enemy submarines were the most prominent threat. Open source 
research indicated that an average missile range for enemy submarines is 44 nautical 
miles while the average range for torpedoes is 10.65 nautical miles (Garrett et al. 2000; 
Sherman 2000). Other metrics obtained from unclassified and open source documents 
include enemy submarines’ operational depth, range, and endurance. Having metrics on 
enemy capabilities provided the data necessary for creating a viable model and simulation 
to evaluate requirements and capabilities.  
Once the prime directive, threat, requirements, and system architecture were 
defined, open source information was again used to generate a range of feasible 
capabilities and their associated costs. These capabilities, when integrated, would result 
in requirements and architecture compliant LCS ASW mission module for open ocean 
escort missions. 
The subsequent analysis is organized as follows: systems engineering process, 
requirements analysis to understand the needs, modeling and simulation, reducing the 





II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The goal of the research is to develop the system’s requirements that address the 
stakeholder’s needs to drive the systems development within cost, schedule, and 
performance. The feasibility of using the LCS to perform open ocean antisubmarine 
warfare is a complex problem requiring a structured process model and design 
methodology. Problem solving is an iterative process. Communication and coordination 
of activities are necessary when problem solving is conducted by a team. To tackle large 
and complex design problem, a design process structures the problem solving (Bucciarelli 
1994).  
In the opinion of this LCS capstone team, the systems engineering “Vee” model is 
the most suitable problem solving process model to use. The reason for this opinion is 
that it provides structured and repeatable design process that allows the team to analyze 
and design a system that is consistent with systems theory and systems engineering 
process. The Vee model was applied to the analysis efforts in this research with the end 
objective of achieving affordable system operational effectiveness (ASOE) (Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook [DAG] 2013). Initial efforts focused on the left side of the Vee 
model or the “customer wants/musts,” which included system requirements definition, 
architecture development, and modeling and simulation (M&S). The right side of the Vee 
model was then exercised through a qualitative analysis of potential capabilities that met 
the requirements and fit within the developed architecture. Finally, life cycle cost (LCC) 
estimates were conducted on candidate solutions. 
A. ANALYSIS PROCESS AND TOOLS  
The analysis processes and tools that were applied in phases with the systems 
engineering process for this report are articulated in Figure 4. Analytical tools used 
include: 
 ExtendSimTM (ExtendSim) and MinitabTM (Minitab) for M&S 
 Microsoft Excel (Excel) for morphological box, quality function diagram 
(QFD), and Pugh matrix 
 6 
 Frontier Technology, Incorporated’s (FTI’s) Integrated Cost Estimation 
(ICE) Software 
 Vitech’s CORETM (CORE) for requirements and architecture development 

































































Figure 4.  Capstone Planning Phases and Analytical Tools 
B. PRIME DIRECTIVE AND THE SE PROCESS 
The SE process for this research began with the need for an independent, 
objective systems engineering analysis of ASW requirements for the LCS platform. The 
analysis was carried out independent of ongoing LCS program ASW acquisition 
activities and associated ASW MM development.  
The prime directive led the LCS team to conduct an analysis to determine the 
feasibility of utilizing the LCS platform to detect, localize and track enemy submarine 
threats to high value, non-combatant vessels during vulnerable transit periods in 
combatant areas of operation (AORs). Therefore, the SE process initially focused on the 
requirements, not on specific subsystems and hardware required for the LCS ASW MM.  
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Following the refinement of a prime directive, the initial concept of operations 
(CONOPS) was developed to support the systems engineering effort. This document 
described how the LCS ASW MM would function in its intended operational 
environment. For the functional architecture, the team used the Department of Defense 
Architecture Framework (DODAF) and Vitech’s CORE. These pictorial views helped 
ensure that requirements were not missed or overlooked.  
Measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance (MOPs), and 
operational requirements were derived from the architecture and CONOPS. CORE was 
used to document and allocate requirements in order to maintain traceability between 
requirements and the functional architecture. M&S augmented requirements development 
to determine the importance and statistical significance of MOPs on system MOEs. 
Finally, a detailed analysis of alternatives (AoA) was conducted, which leveraged the 
system requirements, M&S efforts, qualitative analysis of viable capabilities, and LCC 
estimation. 
C. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The system architecture for this project breaks down the components and 
relationships between those assumed to be inherent capabilities to the LCS class and 
those that were investigated as part of the scope of this effort. The team focused on the 
battle management system functions for detection above and below the water line, the 
combat system, and the deception countermeasures functionality. Figure 5 illustrates 




Figure 5.  System Functional Architecture 
 
 9 
This can be further refined into the three main functions of detect, control, and 
deception as illustrated in Figure 6. The architecture provides traceability between 
components and functionality for the system. It provides a description of the relationships 
among the CORE elements under review. 
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III. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
A. PRIME DIRECTIVE 
The prime directive is to analyze the feasibility of utilizing the LCS platform to 
detect, localize, and track enemy submarines that pose a threat to high value, non-
combatant vessels during vulnerable transit periods in combatant areas of operation 
(AORs). The team conducted research to determine the military utility of the project as 
outlined in the previous sections. According to the current Department of Defense (DOD) 
command structure, Task Force ASW is the command responsible for developing near-
term and far-term transformation for ASW capabilities. The Navy’s Task Force ASW 
states in Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept of Operations for the 21
st
 Century that the 
capabilities to secure the maneuvering area for friendly forces and to hold enemy forces 
at risk are both vital to achieving the prime directive (United States Navy 2009).  
B. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
OPERATIONAL TASKS 
Central to the protection of high value, non-combatant vessels during vulnerable 
transit periods in the combatant AOR is the ability to conduct both defensive and 
offensive operations that bring about the capabilities aforementioned. Specifically, the 
operational tasks include the capabilities to secure friendly maneuver area (SFMA) and 
hold enemy forces at risk (HEFR). Figure 7 illustrates representative ASW forces 
(McDonough 1966). To protect the force or the convoy, McDonough states: 
Surface ASW forces provide ASW screens around the “protected force” to 
prevent the attacking submarine from acquiring an attack position suitable 
for launching a torpedo. This ASW screen is designed to primarily locate, 
report, deter attack, and destroy submarines before they can gain attack 
position…Screening surface and air units operate in the area close around 
the force or convoy and provide the last opportunity for protection against 
enemy submarines. (1966, 9) 
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Figure 7.  Traditional ASW Tactics (from McDonough 1966, 10) 
The operational concept for the LCS Open Ocean ASW study proposes the high 
level operational tasks similar to the tasks as defined by Peter McDonough (1966). The 
LCS ASW operational tasks are outlined below: 
1. Secure Friendly Maneuver Area 
Secure friendly maneuver area is the capability to control and maintain the 
freedom to maneuver in an AOR. This operation includes both offensive and defensive 
tactics to deter and destroy enemy combatants. The Navy’s Task Force ASW describes 
SFMA in the ASW Concept of Operations for the 21
st
 Century and summarized it as an 
area where United States and coalition forces can freely sail between points of interests, 
especially while transiting through vital sea lanes (United States Navy 2009, 2).  
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2. Hold Enemy Forces at Risk 
Task Force ASW shortly detailed the definition of hold enemy forces at risk as a 
posture to ensure that enemy submarines are aware of potential combat responses from 
U.S forces (United States Navy 2009, 2). Persistent offensive capability forces the enemy 
combatants to constantly take defensive actions thereby reducing the enemy’s ability to 
conduct offensive operations.  
3. Search 
According to the Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept, a search can be 
conducted once an operational area has been designated (Naval Doctrine Command 
1998). The limitations on searches vary by mission.  
4. Detection 
As defined by the Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept, detection can be a 
simple act of receiving an unknown signal from either an off-board or onboard sensor. 
(Naval Doctrine Command 1998). Detection does not equate to a positive identification 
of an enemy submarine. 
5. Classification  
Classification is the ability to discriminate a contact as either a submarine or non-
submarine and, if a submarine, determine its identity (Naval Doctrine Command 1998). 
6. Targeting 
Once an enemy submarine has been identified, friendly forces may begin to 
process a firing solution. In order to gain an effective solution, the target must be within a 
specified distance, depth, and other criteria as defined by the Littoral Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Concept (Naval Doctrine Command 1998).  
7. Weapon and Sensor Optimization 
The optimization of weapons and sensors depend on the best available asset 
within the operational area. Further defining the term, the Littoral Anti-Submarine 
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Warfare Concept added that weapons and sensors may be adjusted to obtain a specific 
result against an enemy submarine (Naval Doctrine Command 1998). 
8. Battlespace Shaping 
Battlespace shaping involves extensive planning and the utilization of various 
assets, sensors, and areas in order to achieve the most effective plan. According to the 
Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept, proper battlespace shaping inhibits the enemy 
submarine from entering an operational area (Naval Doctrine Command 1998). 
C. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
Figure 8 depicts the notional operational concept for open ocean ASW. 
 
Figure 8.  Littoral Combat Ship Open Ocean ASW Operational View (OV-1) 
1. Background 
This operational concept is traceable to the ASW Concept of Operations for the 
21st Century written in 2009 that provides the DOD with guidelines to ensure the U.S. 
Navy minimizes or destroys submarine threats (United States Navy 2009). This 
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developmental framework categorizes both near-term and far-term ASW capability 
development to reflect the desired force attributes of “persistence, pervasive awareness, 
speed and operational agility, and technological agility” (United States Navy 2009).  
The ASW CONOPS further details the difference between near-term and far-term 
goals of anti-submarine warfare in several sentences. The goals focus on transformations 
in undersea warfare ranging from assets such as towed arrays to more advanced sensors 
and weapon systems. The near-term ASW transformation emphasizes the enhancement of 
current technologies to include assets such as towed arrays and sonobuoys (Navy 2009). 
The far-term ASW transformation focuses on the exploitation of near-term advances to 
shorten the sensor-to-shooter time by establishing the necessary infrastructure and force 
structure to achieve the aforementioned desired force attributes by utilizing assets such as 
advanced sensors, weapons, and relays (United States Navy 2009). 
2. Concept of Operations 
The LCS Open Ocean ASW concept of operations aligns with the ASW Concept 
of Operations for the 21
st
 Century that approaches the ASW threats by prioritizing a 
series of assets (United States Navy 2009). In this prioritization, sensors and networks are 
placed above weapons and platforms in order to ensure development of capability 
preferences (United States Navy 2009). With operational principles and associated 
capabilities such as those outlined in the ASW CONOPS being developed, the undersea 
battlespace is able to be monitored and secured (United States Navy 2009). 
The tactical employment of the LCS Open Ocean ASW system is to deploy with a 
convoy of high value combatant and non-combatant ships. The LCS mission is to protect 
the high value units (HVUs) during transit to the AOR and to secure the sea lines of 
communication. After arriving at the designated AOR, the LCS is to provide force 
protection by monitoring, patrolling, and defending the outer edges of the battle group. 
Successfully defending the strike group directly supports the application of Sea Shield, 
Sea Strike, and Sea Basing.  
There are two modes of operations. The first mode of operations is the transit 
mode where the LCS is performing escort operation for the HVUs as they transit to the 
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designated AOR. In this mode, the LCS primary mission is to ensure the sea lanes are 
free of submarine threats. The second mode of operation occurs once the HVU is at the 
designated AOR. In this mode, the primary mission is to provide force protection by 
patrolling the outer edges of the strike group or convoy to ensure freedom of maneuver 
within the AOR.  
The transit mode requires the application of a moving screen. On-board sonar 
detection systems are deployed as the LCS moves ahead of the convoy. In the open ocean 
where the sonar environment is less cluttered than the littorals, passive sonar based 
detection is preferred. The effective sonar range of the sonar detection is used to establish 
the screen spacing of the LCS as well as establishing the location where the aviation 
range extender systems should provide coverage. The aviation range extender systems 
have the capability to provide detection via a mixture of sensors, covering a set of 
spectrum, on-board as well as advanced deployable systems to further extend the 
detection range. As the convoy and the LCS move closer to the deployable systems and 
sensors, these deployed systems and range extender are collected, refueled, and prepared 
for the next deployable area by the LCS personnel. Two sets of each system provide the 
necessary rotations to prevent the convoy from stopping.  
In both modes of operation, off-board sensors move ahead of the convoy to 
prepare and monitor the battlespace. Off-board sensors include both surface distributed 
netted sensors (SurDNS) and subsurface distributed netted sensors (SubDNS) that are 
connected via satellites communication. Data from these sensors is uplinked via the 
satellite communication links back to the data processing centers on land and on the LCS 
to develop the common operating picture (COP) by the battle management system 
(BMS). Both the SurDNS and the SubDNS provide persistent detection and cueing. 
Surface and subsurface range extender (SurRE/SubRE) is also forward deployed 
to increase detection and engagement range. Both SurRE and SubRE have the capability 
to engage and provide defense for the LCS as well as the friendly forces in the AOR. 




unmanned, capable of prosecuting arms in an integrated fashion. These non-traditional 
systems and methods provide high volume search and kill rates resulting in the 
destruction of greater number of enemy submarines. 
Sensors and weapons systems on-board the LCS provides another layer of 
offensive and defensive capability. Figure 9 uses the integrated computer aided 
manufacturing definition (IDEF0) for functional transformation through the search 
through engage sequence. 
 
Figure 9.  IDEF0 Context Diagram 
The Navy’s Task Force ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept of Operations for 
the 21
st
 Century is the baseline requirements document for this research project (United 
States Navy 2009). Operational measures of effectiveness (MOEs) were developed 




the Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DODAF) (United States Navy 
2009). Table 1 is the system view illustrating the qualitative process the team used to 
define the most suitable MOEs.  
 
Table 1.   SV-5 Mapping System Functions to Operational Requirements 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines the MOEs as:  
The data used to measure the military effect (mission accomplishment) 
that comes from the use of the system in its expected environment. That 
environment includes the system under test and all interrelated systems, 
that is, the planned or expected environment in terms of weapons, sensors, 
command and control, and platforms, as appropriate, needed to 
accomplish an end-to-end mission in combat (Defense Acquisition 
University [DAU] 2014).  
Another definition, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
(CJCSI 3170.01F), states that MOEs focus on outcomes (Sharp 2007). MOE is further 
decomposed into measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of suitability (MOSs). 
MOPs emphasize performance parameters (DAU 2014). MOSs are derived from the 
operational environment (DAU 2014). In this study, that would include the deep water 
transit areas where the LCS will operate alongside allied warships to protect high value 
units. MOE answers the question concerning what one wants the system to be able to do. 
Central to the HERF objective of the ASW CONOPS, the LCS’s ability to prohibit 
submarine attacks coincides with the Sea Strike and Sea Shield concepts of Sea Power 21 
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(United States Navy 2009). The third leg of Sea Power 21, Sea Basing, is then combined 
with and utilized by FORCEnet to ensure asset management in order to combat ASW 
threats (United States Navy 2009). 
1. Protect High Value Units 
Networked, distributed combat forces promote resiliency in a disaggregated 
architecture thereby reducing the loss of critical combat power when the combat 
capability is centralized in a single ship. Distribution and disaggregation can only do so 
much to reduce the reduction in combat power and combat capabilities. High value units 
(HVUs) provide the bulk of capabilities and combat power. The Chief of Naval 
Operations defines several high value units in OPNAV Instruction 3380.5 concerning 
HVU transit escort operations (Greenert 2010). According to the instruction, the U.S 
Navy (USN) and the U.S Coast Guard (USCG) policies designate and prioritize the 
SSBNs, aircraft carriers, guided missile submarines (SSGNs), attack submarines (SSNs), 
amphibious assault ships (LHAs/LHDs), and military sealift vessels as HVUs (Greenert 
2010). Thus, it is appropriate that the MOE is the protection of HVUs. 
2. Protect Sea Lines of Communication 
The protection of sea lines of communication (SLOC) is of utmost importance for 
many world powers. U.S Navy Captain John Morgan stated:  
ASW is a team sport that requires diverse platforms and capabilities in a 
highly variable operating environment. The undersea environment, 
ranging from the shallows of the littoral to the vast deeps of the great 
ocean basins—and polar regions under ice—demand multi-disciplinary 
approach, subsuming intelligence, oceanography, surveillance and cueing, 
multiple sensors and sensors technologies, coordinated multi-platform 
operations, and underwater weapons. (1998)  
Focusing on SLOC enables surface combatants, particularly the LCS, to be used 
effectively to combat undersea threats. Captain Morgan also emphasizes that the use of 
emerging technology coupled with the understanding of requirements ensures high 
competency in ASW (Morgan 1998).  
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E. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE 
MOPs and MOSs may be combined to support one or multiple MOEs. While 
MOEs answer the question concerning what the system is able to do, MOPs are 
composed of key performance parameters (KPPs) that address the question of what 
capability the system provides. While the performance parameters associated with each 
of the MOPs is not provided due to the scope of this project, a list of MOPs are presented 
here along with rationales in the context of the concept of operations discussed in the 
previous section. Quality function diagram (QFD) was used to define and prioritize the 
MOPs and their contribution to the two MOEs defined previously. Figure 10 illustrates 
the QFD transforming user demands into design quality.  
 
Figure 10.  Measures of Performance 
1. Speed 
The concept of operation calls for the LCS to deploy with the convoy consisting 
of combatants and noncombatants HVUs performing escort operations. Figure 11 
 21 
illustrates the convoy escort geometry requiring the LCS to stay ahead of the convoy 
within the limiting lanes of approach (LLA) to maximize the detection circle and force 
the attacking submarine outside the torpedo danger zone (McDonough 1966). This 
protects against the submarine’s submerged approach from the front of the convoy.  
 
Figure 11.  Convoy Escort Geometry (after McDonough 1966) 
The attack submarine can approach the convoy from the rear if the speed of the 
convoy is less than the speed of the attack submarine. According to the Office of Chief 
Naval Operations, a submarine must maintain stealth and its defense in order to properly 
conduct an attack on a surface vessel (Sternhell and Thorndike 2014, 102). This 
statement underscores the importance of speed. Stealth restricts the submarine’s speed 
and as such, it must maintain a slow approach. In having a slow approach to its target, the 
surface combatants can counter by increasing their speed (Sternhell and Thorndike 2014).  
While the maximum speed of the current LCS platform is classified, according to 
the Office of Naval Research, the fifth installment of the LCS, USS Milwaukee, will be 
the first to benefit from new Axial-Flow Waterjet MK-1 that can propel the LCS to 
speeds greater than 40 knots (Office of Naval Research 2013). In the case of a convoy 
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with an aircraft carrier, the speed of the convoy is determined by the aircraft carrier. The 
Nimitz class carrier can sustain speeds greater than 30 knots. 
2. Endurance 
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) defines different categories of mission 
duration ranging from very short mission duration of less than 30 days to very long 
mission duration greater than 365 days (Appendix A Joint Conditions 2007). According 
to Lockheed Martin, the Freedom variant of the LCS has the capability to cover greater 
than 1,000 nautical miles at a speed of greater than 40 knots and 3,500 nautical miles at 
cruise speed (Lockheed Martin Corporation 2012). In the context of HVU escort 
operations where both the combatants and non-combatants must transit the vast ocean, a 
group of LCS can forward deploy ahead to prepare the battlespace while another group of 
LCS deploys with the convoy. While the exact tactics are beyond the scope of this 
project, operational endurance is a key attribute that the LCS Open Ocean ASW system 
needs to consider. In line with the proposed concept of operations in the previous section, 
endurance is a capability that is not just levied upon the LCS itself but the off-board 
sensors and surface and subsurface systems that are to deploy from the LCS.  
Advanced deployable systems envisioned in the concept of operations in the 
previous section call for the need to loiter in the AOR for long periods of time to monitor 
and prepare the battlespace. In line with the sensor over platform framework, endurance 
is the key enabler for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) providing 
critical and timely situational awareness (SA). Endurance allows the operational planners 
to “drop and forget” these systems laying a network of agents to monitor, report, and cue 
other assets. Mission duration for these deployable systems, including surface, subsurface 
systems and standoff weapons, vary depending on the type of conflict and the level of 
war. Regardless, the need for operational endurance is clearly an important system 
parameter and is a function of numerous factors. While a complete analysis of these 
factors is outside the scope of this paper, it is clear that to continue to operate in the AOR 
these systems need energy. Alternative energy is the enabler for endurance and endurance 
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enables and supports the concept of sensor over platform called for in the ASW Concept 
of Operations for the 21
st
 Century (United States Navy 2009).  
3. Timeliness 
The LCS Open Ocean ASW system is composed of sensors and platforms that 
operate on-board and off-board the LCS sea-frame. Advanced deployable surface and 
subsurface systems are themselves systems in the LCS Open Ocean ASW architecture. 
Together, these systems provide a coordination that is required to address the open ocean 
ASW threat in respect to the modes of operations as defined by the CONOP. This 
modular design requires the establishment of well-defined and standardized interfaces to 
create interoperability and facilitate coordination among systems. The coordinated effort 
necessary to share data requires robust and reliable communication and data relay 
pathways that are both secure and timely. Given the escort geometry (i.e., escort spacing 
relative to the HVUs), combined with the rapid advances in torpedo technology, such as 
the increase in torpedo range, the sensor to shooter time is highly compressed. Data from 
the sensors must be timely in order to provide the intelligence needed to make a decision 
and close the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop.  
4. Interoperability 
The paradigm shift to sensors over platforms as outlined in the ASW Concept of 
Operations for the 21st Century requires the fusing of data from multiple sources. In 
addition, the DOD will continue to operate under a resource and budget constrained 
environment while the required operational missions continue to rise as proliferation of 
technologies allow other nations to challenge the status quo. To satisfy such conditions, 
all resources will be required to work together. This shift from platform specific 
capabilities to more and more joint operations requiring capabilities of various platforms 
gives rise to the need to share data and information thus making interoperability critical 
to achieving the mission objectives. 
In line with the ASW Concept of Operations for the 21st Century is the FORCEnet 
Functional Concept for 21st Century. FORCEnet is defined as “the operational construct  
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and architectural framework for the naval warfare in the Information Age, integrating 
warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat force” (Clark and Hagee 2005, 1).  
Additionally, in the context of the LCS Open Ocean ASW system, 
interoperability is required between the LCS, on-board sensors, off-board sensors, and 
advanced surface and subsurface deployable systems. The LCS is envisioned as the 
moving control node that manages, tasks, and operates the on-board/off-board sensors, 
and surface/subsurface advanced deployable systems. Data from these systems are 
transported back to the LCS to develop the common operating picture (COP) using the 
battle management system (BMS) on-board the LCS(s). The BMS shall provide the 
command and control construct to establish a COP for operational decision-making as 
well as to enable information sharing with platforms external to the LCS Open Ocean 
ASW system. 
5. Under Water Detection Range 
Concealment is the primary advantage that enables the submarine to be an 
effective instrument of war. The vastness of the ocean allows the submarine to operate 
freely and remain undetected as it conducts offensive and defensive operations from 
beneath the sea surface. However, once concealment is taken away, the effectiveness of 
the submarine is neutralized. Thus detection and position fixing are critical in 
antisubmarine warfare. The submarine’s ability to stay undetected affords it the capability 
to conduct a clandestine attack. According to Chapter 8 on “Principles of Underwater 
Sound” in the Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems, the manipulation of energy 
plays a big factor in submarine detection (Academy 2008). 
One possible tactic for conducting the open ocean ASW mission that might be 
employed from LCS would be to engage in a sprint and drift maneuver that would allow 
the LCS to search for threats while being forward deployed ahead of the high value asset. 
The ship would sprint up ahead possibly running active sonar search during this phase 
and then minimize its noise signature by slowing to bare steerage way or drifting at an all 
stop. Acoustic energy is the primary method used for actively searching for submarines. 
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It allows submarines to communicate and navigate and its manipulation greatly alters the 
submarine’s capabilities (Academy 2008). However, the constant changes in the ocean’s 
temperature, salinity, and pressure limits the detection range as well as detection accuracy 
of acoustic based detection systems. 
To overcome such limitations, an understanding of the operational environment 
within the AOR is required. Advanced deployable systems and sensors must be forward 
deployed to provide on-site environmental measurements. Understanding the pressure, 
salinity, and temperature, for example, will aid in the calculation of the figure of merit 
(FOM), a measurement used to define the sonar effective range. The FOM is the 
propagation loss of the acoustic signal that still produces a detection probability of 50 
percent. The inconsistency between the environmental measurements, which affects 
acoustic propagation characteristics, allows the FOM to determine the effective sonar 
range based on the effects of the current operational environment. Peter McDonough 
further supports the importance of the environment by suggesting that the environment 
degrades any information received and given by ASW forces (McDonough 1966, 35).  
The improvement in detection range is highly relevant to ASW tactics and 
operations. In screen and escort operations, the screen spacing is established based on the 
effective sonar range (McDonough 1966). By improving the effective sonar range, screen 
spacing and position of the escort units are able to be widened, which effectively 
increases the sweep width. The expansion increases the range to detect adversarial 
submarines thereby improving underwater detection range.  
6. Under Water Detection Accuracy 
Underwater detection accuracy requires an understanding of not only the sensor 
performance but also the intended operating environment. The constant changes in the 
ocean’s temperature, salinity, and pressure, for example, limit the detection accuracy as 
well as detection range of acoustic based detection systems. Any improvement in the 
understanding of the immediate environment will improve sensor performance to include 
detection accuracy (McDonough 1966). As a result, improving detection accuracy 
supports the requirement to monitor the environment as called for in the ASW Concept of 
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Operations for the 21
st
 Century (United States Navy 2009). Aside from sonar based 
detection techniques, detection accuracy can be improved by non-traditional methods. 
Non-traditional techniques (space based and laser) should be explored to improve 
underwater detection accuracy.  
7. Combat System Reliability 
Combat system reliability is required to neutralize enemy combatants. Combat 
system reliability is absolutely critical in a cooperative, time sensitive, and cueing 
environment as proposed in the CONOP. The escort geometry dictates the short distances 
between the escorts and the HVUs thereby compressing the sensors-to-shooters time. The 
weapon system closest to the area of detection will be tasked to engage the adversary and 
is expected to engage successfully and reliably each time. Combat system reliability has a 
unique relationship to and is affected by weapon pairing, which in turn is driven by its 
sensor performance. 
8. Off-board Sensor Resolution 
Sensor resolution specifies the technical performance of the sensor. Typically, the 
sensor resolution has a direct relationship to the performance of the sensor where an 
improvement in the sensor resolution yields an improvement in sensor performance. 
However, in line with systems thinking and the coordinated approach proposed in the 
concept of operation, this relationship may not be true. Algorithms must be defined to 
exploit the natural phenomena specific to the ASW mission. Improvement in the sensor 
resolution may or may not improve the quality of the data. Sensor resolution for each 
system in the LCS Open Ocean ASW can be traded to satisfy the mission. Regardless of 
the degree of performance of the sensor in terms of sensor resolution appropriate for the 
mission, sensor resolution has a place in defining the attributes of the system that are to 
be part of the ASW solution space from a defensive and offensive perspective. 
9. Surveillance Spectrum 
The key to successful battlespace dominance is ensuring detection of the 
adversary before they either detect us or get in range to effectively deploy their weapons. 
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Therefore, persistent surveillance over the battlefield is critical to detecting, identifying, 
locating, and tracking submarines. Constant surveillance along a specified range with 
specified sonar acoustic characteristics provides leads to optimum protection of the high 
value units. On-board and off-board sensors on both the LCS and the advanced surface 
and subsurface deployable systems will consist of a mixture of sensors that exploit a 
range of surveillance spectrum to sense the natural phenomena. Advances in technology 
allow the submarine to stay submerged for longer periods of time. However, to conduct 
its mission, the submarine is required to position itself relative to its target as well as to 
communicate with its command and control nodes. As the submarine maneuvers, it may 
disturb the natural environment that the netted sensors, using its diverse spectrum, will be 
able to detect. In addition, the submarine communicates with its command and control 
nodes using a combination of very low frequency, extremely low frequency, optical, or 
possibly other novel techniques. A wide range of spectrum used for surveillance aids in 
identifying, locating, and tracking submarines. Together, the sensors on-board the 
advanced deployable systems will complement current and future national intelligence 
assets to provide persistent surveillance capability over the battlefield.  
10. Stealth 
What makes the submarine such an effective weapon of war, among other things, 
is the ability to exploit its operational environment, the ocean, to covertly conduct its 
missions. Advances in quieting technologies further improve the covertness and stealth of 
the modern day submarine. Also, improved hull technology and coating material 
increases the operating depth to unprecedented levels making the act of detecting a 
submarine much more difficult. The LCS Open Ocean ASW must use stealth to combat 
stealth. The self-noise generated by the LCS as it maneuvers is unavoidable. Thus, efforts 
should concentrate on making the sensors and advanced deployable surface and 
subsurface systems as stealthy as practical.  
11. Communications Reliability 
The coordinated approach in the concept of operation calls for the fusion of 
sensors and platforms that require reliable communication. Nations that are capable of 
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operating and sustaining a submarine force are highly likely to possess the capability to 
degrade and disrupt forms of communications. Whether the data is used for command 
and control, cueing, or situational awareness, communication lies at the heart of the 
concept of operation. In the contested environment, reliable communication is critical. A 
robust, jam proof, reliable communications and data relay system should be implemented 
that accounts for the enormous coverage area of a theater battlespace in addition to the 
multiple localized and restrictive operational areas 
F. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The allocation of functional requirements was broken down into four main system 
tasks. These functions were defined as establishing a search plan, running the search, 
managing contacts, and engaging the enemy. These functions align with the “ASW 
Functional Analysis” white paper (ASW Functional Analysis 2014). The engagement 
portion was only partially explored to include assigning a target and managing tracks, but 
the rest of the firing solution was outside the scope of this paper. Figure 12 depicts the 




Figure 12.  Functional Requirements Decomposition 
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IV. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
The MOPs were developed after the MOEs were defined. The two system-level 
MOEs are the protection of HVUs and the protection of SLOC. During the system 
architecture and requirements definition phase, the team consolidated a list of MOPs, and 
using the qualitative QFD process, generated the MOPs that supported the two MOEs. To 
provide a quantitative approach, the team constructed a model using ExtendSim to 
provide insight into the system MOPs. Specifically, the decision was made to conduct 
modeling, simulation, and design of experiments to quantitatively capture the MOPs that 
contributed to the protection of HVUs since the pillars of Sea Power 21 such as Sea Base, 
Sea Shield, and Sea Strike are centered on the HVUs such as the CVN.  
As such, the application of modeling and simulation for this study focused on the 
LCS protecting an HVU, such as a nuclear powered aircraft carrier (CVN), from enemy 
submarine threats in an open-ocean environment. The model development was driven by 
the system-level MOPs rather than the overall concept of operations. This is due in part to 
the fact that an undetected submarine presents the greatest threat in any operational 
scenarios and that, first and foremost, mission success is driven by the timely detection of 
the submarine. Also, the kill chain analysis performed during the requirements definition 
phase places the need to timely detect, identify, and track the submarine to neutralize the 
threats to the HVUs. Thus, HVUs protection, in this case, is the operational tasks of 
detecting, identifying, and tracking the submarine threats in the open ocean.  
The probability of detecting an enemy submarine is the most critical phase when 
it comes to neutralizing the submarine threats. Once the submarine is detected, successful 
engagement with the submarine depends on the weapon system effectiveness such as the 
probability of acquisition and hit, a function of weapon’s figure of merit and 
performance. While successful engagement with the submarine depends on numerous 
factors, the modeling and simulation efforts are focused on the probability of detection, 
which includes range (a function of sweep width), speed, and endurance (a function of 
search time). It is also important to note that the model was not designed to determine 
pass/fail criteria or the probability of successfully executing the mission. It was designed 
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to provide insights into whether the LCS is a viable option for the ASW mission and if so 
what general specifications made the LCS acceptable, such as range, speed, and 
endurance. 
According to the Naval Operations Analysis, detection ranges vary due to a 
submarine’s relative motion (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999, 157). Once the target 
is within the sensor ranges, the measure of performance that can be used for determining 
the effectiveness of sensors is probability of detection. The probability of detection 
assumes that detection occurs at least once during a specified time interval. One of the 
parameters used in probability of detection is sweep width. Sweep width is defined as “a 
number that gauges a sensor’s effectiveness under specified environmental conditions 
against a given class of targets. Each detection device (radar, sonar, eyeball, etc.) should 
be characterized by its capabilities by a single number that is operationally meaningful” 
(Wagner, Mylander and Sanders 1999, 165). 
In line with sweep width is sweep rate. Sweep rate is a critical factor because 
“many sensors mounted on a moving platform have their detection effectiveness 
degraded when the speed of the platform is increased, that is the sweep width is a 
decreasing function of speed” (Wagner, Mylander and Sanders 1999, 167). This measure 
of performance is relevant because to effectively search for an object requires searching 
in many areas. Increasing search areas require the searcher to move thus making sweep 
rate a critical factor in the probability of detection. 
The surface combatant conducting anti-submarine patrols may search in a 
predetermined or a random operational area. In a random search, the unidentified threat 
may be in any part of the area. The Navy Operations Analysis describes the probability of 
detection during a random search as a lower bound and equally distributed between 
search areas (Wagner, Mylander and Sanders 1999, 174). The team decided to apply the 
random search theory to the modeling and simulation efforts as described in the 
following sections. In addition, it is important to note that the values of the model are 
based on the envisioned concept of operations as well as open source information that 
may not be accurate performance values. However, the methodology is sound and can be 
repeated with actual performance values if the need should arise.  
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A. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The model performed a random search for enemy submarine threats using sweep 
width (w) and velocity (v) inputs to produce a probability of detecting a submarine in a 
given period of time (t).  
1. Sweep width (w) was measured in nautical miles (nm) and defined as the 
width of the path that the sensors can sweep within a given period of time 
(t).  
2. Search time (t) was measured in hours (h) and the baseline model started 
with a 2 hour (h) search time. The concept of operation envisions a 
moving screen therefore 2 hour search time is appropriate. 
3. A circular area with a 22 kilometer radius (approximately 12nm radius) 
was used to define the search area. This distance was obtained based on an 
assumed maximum effective range of submarine launched torpedoes. The 
area of this region, A, is defined in the model as 
                             
4. Velocity (v) in these equations encompassed the range of speed and 
endurance characteristics for possible advanced deployable systems and 
sensor platforms that could be integrated in an LCS ASW mission module. 
It was measured in knots, nautical miles per hour (nm/h) and endurance 
was measured in (nm) or hours (h). Velocity range included the LCS itself, 
a sensor, or a range extender such as a Vertical Takeoff Aerial Vehicle 
(VTAV). The model did not discriminate which specific object was 
traveling at an assigned speed. Table 2 defines the speed in knots per hour 












LCS (Pike 2014) 18 kt/h 40 kt/h 3500 nm 1000 nm 
VTAV (MH-60 R/S 
2012) 
70 kt/h 140 kt/h 2.7 h No Data 
Table 2.   Speed and Range Variables 
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5. Equation 2 was used in this model to determine probability of detection.  
                 
    
  (Wagner, Mylander and Sanders 1999, 174)  
The equation assumes that the patrolling vehicle searches at speed (v) 
through the region and that a systematic search path relative to the target is 
not used. Additionally, the model assumes there is always a target in the 
area where the convoy is transitioning in order to produce a probability of 
detection for all model runs. 
6. For sweep rate calculations, which are a contributor to the probability of 
detection, Equation 3 shows the formula as speed (v) times sweep width 
(w). 
                      (Wagner, Mylander and Sanders 1999, 167)  
7. Different types of submarines emit different frequencies of detection. The 
signal strength of different submarines also varies drastically depending 
on submarine class. The model in this study does not take into 
consideration any of these effects and assumes very little is known about 
the enemy submarine. The model assumes a fixed submarine characteristic 
and does not use variables such as hull harmonics or engine noise 
correlation characteristics. 
B. MODEL EXECUTION 
A baseline model was built as a starting point for the modeling and simulation 
efforts. The baseline and subsequent analysis are represented in Table 3. Subsequent runs 
doubled speed (v), sweep width (w) and search time (t) inputs to assess the impact of 
such increases on probability of detection. Each had an equal impact on the probability of 



















Baseline 0.043268 10 12 2 0.5 20 
Double Speed 0.084664 20 12 2 0.5 40 
Double Sweep 
Width 
0.084664 20 12 2 1 20 
Double Search 
Time 
0.084664 10 12 4 0.5 20 
Table 3.   Random Search Results 
To account for the impact of more than one LCS ASW mission model equipped 
ships, the variable (s) was used to indicate the number of LCS ships. The probability of 
detection for more than one ship is defined in Equation 4 as 
 Eq. 4.) Pd(multi) = 
                          
                                              
 (Hayter 2007, 159)  
When more than one ship is involved, the probability of detection is defined in Equation 
5 as 
                                         (  (      )
 
) (Hayter 2007, 159)  
When two ships are randomly searching for the submarine in a uniformly 
distributed area, there is a possibility for search overlap to occur. By comparing two LCS 
ASW mission module equipped ships in the above equation to the baseline number of one 
LCS ASW mission module equipped ship that has doubled sweep width, search speed, or 
search time, it was determined that doubling the number ships has the same effect as 
doubling sweep width, search speed, and search time. As a result, Equation 6 of the 
random search model was simplified to provide probability of detection as 
 Eq 6.)          
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Table 4 displays that increasing the number of LCS ASW mission module 
equipped ships provides statistically significant increases in probability of detection and 





















Baseline - 1 0.043268 10 12 2 0.5 20 
2 0.084664 20 12 2 0.5 20 
3 0.124269 30 12 2 0.5 20 
4 0.16216 40 12 2 0.5 20 
5 0.198412 50 12 2 0.5 20 
6 0.233095 60 12 2 0.5 20 
7 0.266278 70 12 2 0.5 20 
8 0.298025 80 12 2 0.5 20 
9 0.328398 90 12 2 0.5 20 
10 0.357457 100 12 2 0.5 20 
Table 4.   Multi-Ship Random Search Results  
C. SIMULATION WITH DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
The intent of the design of experiments (DOE) combined with the model was to 
determine which MOP had the most impact on probability of detection when uncertainty 
was introduced into the model. The simulation executed DOE on the sweep width, search 
time, velocity, and number of LCS ASW mission module equipped variables. The DOE 
used four factors for each parameter at 10 replications resulting in a combination of 2,560 
events. For the overarching random search model, a binomial approach similar to a coin 
flip was taken. The 2,560 events were added to an ExtendSim simulation where range 
became a randomized parameter. For each run, the target was either found or it was not 
found. The ExtendSim simulation had a resolution of 50 opportunities for detection 
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during each event. Results of the ExtendSim simulation were imported into the DOE 
software, Minitab, for analysis. Follow-on results of the DOE analysis are shown in 
Figure 13 and Figure 14.  
 
Figure 13.  Main Effects Plot for Detection 
Figure 13 shows the response mean for detection for each factor level. As each 
data point increases in each factor, the probability of detection also increases. A 
practically important factor is determined by the steepness of the slope. The steeper 
slopes indicate important factors. Figure 13 illustrates that the effect of search time, 
sweep width, and speed are similar and have almost equal impact on the probability of 
detection. This similarity is represented by the similar steepness of their slopes. Based on 
a multilevel factorial design experiment, increasing the number of LCS ASW mission 
module equipped ships produces the greatest probability of detection. Analysis of the 
model also yielded that each factor is statistically significant with p-values less than 0.05. 
 38 
 
Figure 14.  Interaction Plot for Detection 
Figure 14 illustrates how the different parameters interacted with each other to 
affect the probability of detection from the simulation. A full factorial design resolution 
was used to produce the plots to ensure that all combinations were accounted. The search 
time, sweep width, number of LCS, and speed were analyzed to determine if interactions 
occurred between one another. Based on the simulation, as the number of each factor 
increased during comparison, the probability of detection also increased. As a guideline, 
interactions will be present when the lines intersect each other. Due to the parallel nature 
of each plot, no interaction between combinations of factors is present.  
D. MODELING AND SIMULATION CONCLUSIONS 
The greatest impact on increasing probability of detection will occur in the 
following priority order: 
1. Increasing number of LCS 
2. Increasing sweep width of sensors 
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3. Increasing speed of patrolling platforms 
4. Increasing search time 
This model and simulation has important possibilities for future application for 
any analysts attempting to use it for more detailed decision-making. It is recommended 
that this model be decomposed with more detailed program specific, non-open source 
performance parameters and then broken out by individual capabilities included in the 
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V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
An analysis of alternatives was conducted based on the results of performance 
modeling, functional architecture and the cost analysis. To associate potential solutions, a 
Pugh matrix was used. The Pugh matrix, developed by Stuart Pugh, is a decision-making 
tool to provide systems engineering the ability to compare alternative solutions for a 
system (Burge 2009). They are generally used to subjectively reduce a set of alternatives 
to a subset that leave the most important characteristics included in the next steps of 
evaluation. For the comparison of alternative systems to be effective, the alternative 
systems must be compared to the baseline performance and cost of the existing system. 
The Pugh matrix facilitates this process by visually presenting which alternative systems 
are below the baseline performance and cost. These alternative systems are not included 
in the possible solution space so that only alternative systems that perform better than the 
baseline become part of the possible architecture. Follow-on solutions were then 
transposed using a morphological box to illustrate the best option or combination of 
options. Through the architecture, MOEs from stakeholder requirements and how each 
one can be achieved were defined. These MOEs were then used to define the functions of 
the LCS open ocean ASW mission module during the requirement analysis.  
A. PUGH MATRIX 
The Pugh matrix (see Figure 15) was used to compare alternative technologies for 
the Open Ocean ASW baseline. The Pugh matrix was also helpful for limiting the 
permutations of alternatives and enabling the focus to remain on ensuring the prime 
directive was maintained. A comparison through the requirement MOEs generated a 
solution based on the requirements alone.  
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Figure 15.  Pugh Matrix of Design Characteristics versus Assets 
Comprehensive research on current ASW threats as well as research on existing 
systems was conducted. From the research, a baseline was established that allowed for 
comparative values within the Pugh matrix. The baseline was then measured against the 
design characteristics and graded as whether it is better, “+,” worse, “-,” or the same, “S.” 
Initial results of the Pugh matrix from the comparison between requirements and existing 
assets generated a solution indicating that the helicopter or vertical take-off aerial vehicle 
(VTAV) with sonar would be an ideal system for the LCS Open Ocean ASW mission 
module when concerned with the speed and distance that searches and detection only. 
When focusing on the submerged enemy threats, the interoperability of the LCS deployed 
variable depth sonar makes it an ideal solution when combined with the helicopter asset.  
Additionally, various trade-off studies were conducted. off-board sensors such as 
those installed from external entities were compared to on-board tools. To add an 
additional variable to the assets, capabilities of unmanned vehicles were compared to 
their manned counterparts. A detailed cost analysis provided an asset’s acquisition, 
integration, operations, support, and life cycle cost.  
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Incorporating cost into the evaluation, more detailed solutions were revealed 
during the Pugh matrix analysis. Ensuring that possible alternatives met the requirements 
criteria and followed the prime directive, the helicopter asset combined with the deployed 
variable depth sonar once again proved to be most viable solution; however it is the most 
expensive option with a total life cycle cost of over $2.4 billion, for the MH-60R, a 
vertical takeoff aerial vehicle asset, and the CAPTAS 2, a deployable variable depth 
sonar, with a total life cycle cost of $850 million. The combined cost also incorporates 
the ability to search, detect, and classify potential threats to the high value unit but lacks 
the ability to use an on-board process, adds another $920 million to the total. A potential 
alternative is the summation of two or three separate systems to achieve the same 
objective. In this alternative, adding the lowest costing assets capable of searching, 
detecting, and classifying, points to the combination of USV, AN/SQQ-89, and the 
MFTA produces a total life cycle cost of $1.7 billion. The comparison between a single 
solution to that of a compilation of systems allows the stakeholders and systems 
engineering practical options to support the prime directive. Based on the information 
from the Pugh matrix, any alternative must contain the LCS surface ASW combat system 
in order to ensure an on-board ASW combat system capability. 
B. MORPHOLOGICAL BOX 
Comparisons were made in a Morphological Box to help narrow down the field of 
concept alternatives reducing the design space to reveal a reasonable set of combinations 
of interest (see Figure 16). Deducing from the results of the modeling and simulation, it 
was discovered that as the number of LCS increase, the probability of detection also 
increased. To improve the analysis, adding more LCS seaframes to the battlespace will be 
dependent on the requirements of specific missions. 
From the possible combination of alternatives in the morphological box, the MH-
60R helicopter combined with the CAPTAS 2 and the AN/SQQ-89 provided the best 
capability to conduct detection, identification, tracking and engagement capabilities. 
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Figure 16.  Morphological Box of Possible Combination of Alternatives cost analysis 
Research and analysis was performed to characterize and evaluate feasible LCS 
capabilities that would enable it to execute the open ocean ASW operational tasks to 
search, detect, and classify targets. Permutations of weapons and sensors were 
investigated to establish combinations that could provide adequate capability to fulfill the 
requirements and CONOPS as defined for this project. System attribute data for 
commercially available systems, as well as U.S. Navy programs and capstones, was 
collected. For the purpose of developing life cycle cost (LCC) estimates, system attribute 
data collected included cost, technical maturity, basic capabilities, size, and physical 
composition.  
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VI. COST ANALYSIS 
A. COST ESTIMATING METHODOLOGY 
The DOD identifies four major analytical methods or cost estimating techniques 
used to develop cost estimates for acquisition programs: analogy; parametric (statistical); 
engineering (bottoms up); and actual costs (Department of Defense 1992). Estimating by 
analogy was used for LCC estimation in this analysis due to the unavailability of specific 
design and work breakdown structure (WBS) data for the commercial and DOD 
capabilities that were analyzed and to stay system agnostic throughout. Parametric 
analysis was performed on the individual capabilities based upon unit cost, weight, 
material composition, and estimated integration complexity in order to estimate 
acquisition and platform integration costs. Operations and support (O&S) costs were 
estimated based upon analogous system O&S costs or by utilizing the average percentage 
of LCC that acquisition costs typically account for, which is ~28 percent (Edwards 2010). 
Figure 17 represents the cost estimating process and methodology used for this analysis.  
To simplify the cost estimating process, the Integrated Cost Estimation® (ICE
TM
) 
software tool developed by Frontier Technology, Incorporated (FTI) was utilized. ICE 
integrates multiple parametric cost databases, provides a wizard driven process, and 
tailors estimates for service specific cost elements and system applications. For this 
estimate, Galorath’s SEER for Hardware, Electronics, and SystemTM (SEER-H), 
parametric cost analysis database was integrated with FTI’s ICE software to aid in the 




Figure 17.  Cost Estimating Process 
B. CAPABILITIES AND ANALOGOUS SYSTEMS 
Based on the research performed, capabilities in many cases assist in the 
performance of multiple LCS ASW operational tasks. The groupings in the following 
subsections illustrate the various operational tasks used to construct the cost estimation 
analysis. 
1. Search, Detection, and Classification 
The following systems contribute to the initial functional blocks needed to satisfy 
the search, detect, and classify portions of the mission. Tables 5-11 provide descriptions 
for each of the mission systems identified. 
 
Description 
Unmanned, autonomous, submersible operated and maintained 
from the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Capabilities 
The UUV tows active transducer and a multi-function receive array, 
transmitting submarine contact data via data links to the LCS. 
Analogous System Remote Multi Mission Vehicle (RMMV)  
Technical Maturity 
Analogous system is delivered and deployed. Additional array and 
transducer capabilities exist today. 







Unmanned, autonomous, surface vehicle operated and maintained from 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Capabilities 
The USV is equipped with a towed array, active source, and dipping 
sonar to detect enemy submarines and transmitting submarine contact 
data via data links to the LCS. 
Analogous System Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) 
Technical Maturity 
Analogous system is delivered and deployed. Array, active source, and 
dipping sonar capabilities exist today. 
Table 6.   Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) Description 
Description 
Manned aerial vehicle that will be deployed from the LCS for submarine 
detection and communicate back with the LCS platform through real 
time data exchange. 
Capabilities 
The VTAV is equipped with long range active dipping sonar, radar with 
periscope detection capability, and acoustic processing for processing 
dipping sonar, and sonobuoys. 
Analogous System MH-60R 
Technical Maturity Analogous system is delivered and deployed. 
Table 7.    Vertical Takeoff Aerial Vehicle (VTAV) Description 
Description 
Unmanned, autonomous, aerial vehicle that will be operated and 
maintained from the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Capabilities 
The VTUAV is equipped with dipping sonar, radar with periscope 
detection capability, and acoustic processing for processing dipping 
sonar, and sonobuoys. 
Analogous System MQ-8B 
Technical Maturity 
Analogous system is delivered and deployed. Dipping sonar and 
sonobuoys capabilities exist today. 
Table 8.   Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTAUV) Description 
Description 
Towed body and handling system resident on and deployed from the 
LCS 
Capabilities 
Medium frequency active sonar, torpedo detection, and receive array for 
Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) 
Analogous System Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA) 
Technical Maturity Analogous system is delivered and deployed. 





Description Consists of a towed array and towed body deployed from the LCS.  
Capabilities 
The VDS Allows the ship to transmit and receive at the right depth with 
two separate arrays and maximize the detection of extremely quiet 
submarines. It is low frequency active and passive sonar. 
Analogous System 
Combined Active and Passive Towed Array Sonar (CAPTAS) 
(commercial) 
Technical Maturity Analogous system is delivered and deployed. 
Table 10.   LCS Deployed Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) Description 
Description 
X-band, pulse Doppler, frequency agile radar consisting of an above 
deck antenna unit, below deck cabinets, and a motor generator. 
Capabilities 
Performs periscope, Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM), surface threat, 
lower flying aircraft, UAV and helicopter detection and provides real 
time track information to the ship combat system. 
Analogous System AN/SPQ-9B 
Technical Maturity Analogous system is delivered and deployed. 
Table 11.   LCS On-board Periscope Detection Radar Description 
2. Targeting and Weapon and Sensor Optimization 
The combat system (see Table 12) implements the tasks for the functionality 
needed to satisfy the portions of the mission that perform targeting and optimization of 
weapons and sensors, as well as data management and command and control. 
 
Description 
Consists of Anti-Submarine Warfare Control System (AWCS) including 
processors, displays, software and a sonobuoys processing system  
Capabilities 
Integrates underwater warfare combat management, fire control and on-
board training to detect, locate, track and engage submarine targets. It 
transmits and/or receives acoustic signals using a variety of sensors to 
provide target classification, as well as performing and controlling 
Target Motion Analysis (TMA) and controlling the setting of ‘own ship’ 
ASW weapons. In addition, it provides multi-sensor track correlation, 
track management control and forwards track data to the ship’s Combat 
Direction System (CDS) 
Analogous System AN/SQQ-89(V)14  
Technical Maturity 
Analogous system is delivered and deployed. Additional array and 
transducer capabilities exist today. 
Table 12.   Surface ASW Combat System Description 
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3. Battlespace Shaping and Self Defense 
The decoy systems are included to achieve the required abilities needed for 
battlespace shaping and self-defense (see Table 13). 
 
Description Consists of a towed decoy device and shipboard signal generator 
Capabilities 
The decoy emits signals to draw a torpedo away from its intended target. 
The signal emulates ship noise, such as propeller and engine noise, 
which is more attractive than the ship to the torpedo’s sensors 
Analogous System AN/SLQ-25 
Technical Maturity Analogous system is delivered and deployed. 
Table 13.   Torpedo Countermeasures Description 
C. SCHEDULE, SERVICE LIFE, INFLATION, POPULATION, AND FISCAL 
YEAR 
Table 14 lists schedule assumptions made in the cost estimate based upon the 
parameters in the December 2013 LCS Mission Module Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR) (Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval [DAMIR] 2013).  
 
Service Life 28 years 
Development and Integration Start FY15 
Production Period 6 years 
Development Period 2 years 
Operations and Support Period 33 Years 
Table 14.   Schedule Assumptions 
Table 15 is a direct export from the ICE software tool and presents the production 
and deployment schedule use in the cost analysis. 
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Table 15.   Schedule Summary 
All costs were entered in the ICE tool in base year (BY) 2006 dollars. All cost 
outputs are presented in fiscal year (FY) 2015 dollars. There are a total of 16 mission 
modules and the cost estimation assumes that capability analyzed includes one system 
(e.g., one UUV or one USV).  
D. CAPABILITY COST ESTIMATION 
The following sections present the cost inputs and associated summary LCC 
outputs for each capability. The numbers are approximations and represent a rough 
estimate of acquisition, integration, operations, support, and LCC based upon analogous 
systems. Further analysis of classified and FOUO design information related to the LCS 
platform would be required if this cost model were to be used for decision making 
purposes. As such, this information can be considered open source. 
 
COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$32M 




Weight 14,500 lbs. 
RMMV Fact Sheet (Remote 
Multi-Mission Vehicle 2013) 
O&S Cost Per System ~$3.8M 
% of TOC given 28% 
(procurement)/72%(O&S) 
(Edwards 2010) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
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Environment Use Submersible SEER-H 
Development 
Standards 
Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 16.   UUV Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$680M ~$1.7B ~$2.4B 
Table 17.   UUV Cost Estimation Profile 
COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$6.7M 




Weight 14,500 lbs. 
ASW USV White Paper 
(Hillenbrand and Beeson 
2006) 
O&S Cost Per System 
Per Year 
~$.8M 
% of TOC given 28% 
(procurement)/72%(O&S) 
(Edwards 2010) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
Environment Use Sea - Surface SEER-H 
Development 
Standards 
Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 18.   USV Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$250M ~$410M ~$660M 
Table 19.   USV Cost Estimation Profile 
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COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$38M 
MH-60R SAR (Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) 
2011) 
Weight 21,650 lbs. 
MH-60R SAR (Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) 
2011) 
O&S Cost Per System 
Per Year 
~$3.5M 
MH-60R SAR (Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) 
2011) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
Environment Use Air-Manned SEER-H 
Development 
Standards 
Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 20.   VTAV Cost Estimation Inputs 
 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$840M ~$1,600M ~$2.5B 
Table 21.   VTAV Cost Estimation Profile 
 
COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$10.4M 
MQ-8B SAR (MQ-8B 
Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR) 2012) 
Weight 14,500 lbs. MQ-8B Specification Sheet 
O&S Cost Per System 
Per Year 
~$2.6M 
MQ-8B SAR (MQ-8B 
Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR) 2012) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 






Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 22.   VTUAV Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$205M ~$1,300M ~$1,500M 
Table 23.   VTUAV Cost Estimation Profile 
COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$4.4M 
FY15 DDG51 P8A Budget 
Exhibit (DoD 2014) 
Weight 1850 lbs. 
The Naval Institute Guide to 
the Ships and Aircraft of the 
US Navy (Palomar 2013) 
O&S Cost Per System 
Per Year 
~$40,000 
AN/SQQ-89 Visibility and 
Management of Operations 
and Support Cost (United 
States Navy 2014) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
Environment Use Submersible SEER-H 
Development 
Standards 
Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 24.   LCS Deployed Towed Array Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$90M ~$21M ~$110M 
Table 25.   LCS Deployed Towed Array Cost Estimation Profile 
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COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$10.5M 




Weight 1850 lbs. 
The Naval Institute Guide to 
the Ships and Aircraft of the 
US Navy (Palomar 2013) 
O&S Cost Per System 
Per Year 
~$1.3M 
% of TOC given 28% 
(procurement) / 72%(O&S) 
(Edwards 2010) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
Environment Use Submersible SEER-H 
Development 
Standards 
Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 26.   LCS Deployed Variable Depth Sonar Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$200M ~$640M ~$840M 
Table 27.   LCS Deployed Variable Depth Sonar Cost Estimation Profile 
COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$5.8M 
Northrop Grumman Contract 
Award (Northrop Grumman 
2013) 
Weight 1,185 lbs. 
The Naval Institute Guide to 
the Ships and Aircraft of the 
US Navy (Palomar 2013) 
O&S Cost Per System 
Per Year 
~$2.6M 
SPQ-9B VAMOSC (United 
States Navy 2014) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
Environment Use Sea SEER-H 




Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 28.   LCS On-board Periscope Detection Radar Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$110M ~$1,300M ~$1,400M 
Table 29.   LCS On-board Periscope Detection Radar Cost Estimation Profile 
COST INPUTS 
Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$41M 
FY15 DDG51 P-8A Budget 
Exhibit (DoD 2014) 
Weight 4,000 lbs. 
The Naval Institute Guide to 
the Ships and Aircraft of the 
US Navy (Palomar 2013) 




(United States Navy 2014) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
Environment Use Sea SEER-H 
Development 
Standards 
Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 30.   Surface ASW Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$720M ~$190M ~$910M 






Attribute Value Source 
Unit Cost ~$1.3M 
FY15 DDG51 P-8A Budget 
Exhibit (DoD 2014) 
Weight 1,676 lbs. 
The Naval Institute Guide to 
the Ships and Aircraft of the 
US Navy (Palomar 2013) 




(United States Navy 2014) 
Material Content SEER-H Defaults SEER-H 
Environment Use Submersible SEER-H 
Development 
Standards 
Military Full SEER-H 
Application Type 
Complex Assembly of 
Purchased Parts 
SEER-H 
Table 32.   Torpedo Countermeasures Cost Estimation Inputs 
COST PROFILE 
Acquisition and Integration Cost Operations and Support Cost Life Cycle Cost 
~$36M ~$28M ~$65M 
Table 33.   Torpedo Countermeasures Cost Estimation Profile 
E. LIFE CYCLE COST CONSIDERATIONS 
LCC considerations are critical inputs to the AoA process used to determine the 
most affordable and operationally effective LCS ASW MM solution. The UUV, VTAV, 
VTUAV, and LCS on-board periscope detection radar represent significant LCC 
commitments for the LCS program, ranging from over $1 billion to $2.4 billion in total 
LCC. The USV, LCS deployed towed array, and VDS represent more affordable 
solutions ranging from $100 million to $800 million total LCC. The Surface ASW 
Combat System and torpedo countermeasures have a low LCC in comparison to their 
acquisition and integration cost due to the maturity of these systems and years of cost 




The LCS is a viable candidate for use in the open ocean ASW mission role. The 
LCS’s ability to expand its capabilities through the use of changing mission modules 
makes it a unique naval vessel. In order for the LCS to perform the open ocean ASW role 
it must have carefully selected module components and associated host sensors to ensure 
ASW mission success. After careful modeling and simulation of the previously discussed 
parameters, the team used Pugh matrix and morphological boxes to help interpret the data 
and try to establish some recommended combinations of assets for potential ASW open 
ocean capability. The findings demonstrate that the recommended LCS open ocean ASW 
mission module should include the LCS ASW Combat System, an air asset such as the 
MH-60R with its capability to search, detect, and classify potential threats to the high 
value unit, and the CAPTAS 2. The low cost of the LCS when compared to the cost of a 
submarine allows for the use of multiple LCS’s in this role. These multiple LCSs can 
search out large areas quickly and with the addition of the VTAVs will have increased 
search area and search speed. The added advantage of having these larger search areas 
and faster search speeds is earlier detection, which leads to higher probabilities of 
successful transit for high value units. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The high cost of the MH-60 creates a challenging acquisition decision because it 
provides the required capabilities to detect, identify, and track but lacks sea depth 
detection fidelity and comes at a high operational cost. A more cost effective alternative 
to consider includes utilizing unmanned or internal assets such as a combination of the 
multi-function towed array with unmanned undersea vehicles and a host system 
comparable to the AN/SQQ-89.  
At this point, further study of these options would be needed to assist in choosing 
the best alternative based on program management desires to balance risk and budget 
assessments. This study could be extended to include an evaluation of the LCS passive 
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sonar performance and its capabilities in other ASW searches that were not covered in 
this report. Utilizing resources other than open sources may provide additional 
combinations that could reveal a more effective solution for the LCS open ocean ASW 
mission. Having realistic data for offensive and defensive anti-submarine warfare assets 
and threats would provide a more exact model to produce more accurate results. These 
results can be compared with the project’s cost estimation and help to gain insight for 
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